...May the dialogue and debate continue...education and family

...Que el diálogo y debate continuén...educación y familia

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Abstract

Walking in today, thinking about today, is somehow the result of a process. Process that entails philosophically speaking to open ourselves to the contemporary debate on: Modernity, Education and Family.

Keywords

Modernity-Education-Family-Face/s

Resumen

Caminar en el hoy, pensar en el hoy, es de alguna forma el resultado de un proceso. Proceso que permite, filosóficamente hablando, abrirnos al debate contemporáneo sobre: *Modernidad, Educación y Familia*.

Palabras Clave

Modernidad-Educación-Familia-Rostro/s

Dialogue and Debate

Interpreting the Family from critical thinking is the starting point. The aforementioned, will lead to walking with perseverance to be able to intertwine in the different routes, research and training trajectories, to relate family-school in pursuit of educating the citizen, respecting the differences and on the basis of certain parameters. This requires developing variables with principles that provide senses and purposes that organize the

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human, where the opening of the debate with a philosophical, anthropological –

political, socio-cultural meaning of its own, that causes changes and profound transformations to modify the immutable, contributing to deconstruct what is already traveled from multiple entrances and exits, with their lines of flight so that the difference is a real emergent.

Family in the present century, somewhat deinstitutionalized that renounces action founding of law and in the words of Hegel, is the price of hatred against the law. Absence of relevance in the "private" sphere with constant wear and tear on it from the "public sphere". Therefore, the legal, instead of responding to reality in its unpredictable forms of social conflict, acts from an extrinsic legalization of decisions of a political nature.

Kant and Hegel represent in modern times two antithetical positions of philosophical thought regarding the fact of the family: contractualism and institutionalism. The first position is more in line with the modern demands of individual freedom and the second position integrates freedom in a community order that is not exhausted in a sterile formalism, where the existence of the family is endowed with its own moral value.

For Lévi Strauss, the family seems to be structured, as a society, to essential rules that connote family ties. As a constitutive fact of the human, normativity places the experience of man under the sign of the limit.

In this modernity that expresses being postmodern, the idea is to rethink the institutions. In the words of Hegel in his "Philosophy of Law" and in the "Ethical Philosophy", he raises three great institutions of the early nineteenth century: family, civil society and political society. That is to say, the family state as a society in some way where the moral conscience of the right, the

external law of the internal law comes together. Institution as the first factor of socialization.

For Parsons, as for Hegel, the family is not a small society; It can be considered as a partial social system that must be referred to a broader partial system that is society. For Hegel, the family is not in itself the whole society, nor does it reflect the whole society; this same principle is fundamental to Parsons; The family is a social subsystem that has a series of very subtle relationships with the total social system. But, there should not be that mistake that identifies the family with society.

Family subsystem as an action system (in Parsons' expression), which is essentially reduced to a minimal expression; interactive relationship of an ego and an alter as both physical and biological organisms as personalities, as social protagonists, expressing each other in terms of the roles they occupy.

Interaction measured by cultural codes that regulate action and if they are internalized in the personality, they become cultural codes. Human relationships (Hegel) that manifest as cultural, spiritual relationships, where spirit and culture are mediated by signs and symbols. In other words, because of that second nature that man has carved through the conquest of culture (language, knowledge, religion, expression, among others.). Culture as an external entity (Parsons), culture as an internal element (Hegel).

Mediation in this transit is the process of socialization, having the family as a relevant function to carry out this process. Both Parsons and Hegel consider that the family revolves around two fundamental axes: the instrumental role and the expressive role, and the generation that indicates a difference in power and control of the socialization processes, where both define, according to these authors, the structure of the family.

Paraphrasing P. Bourdieu "…The family is a construction principle, both immanent to individuals (as an incorporated collective) and transcendent in relation to them, since they rediscover it in the form of objectivity in all others: it is a transcendental in the sense of Kant, but being immanent to all habitus, it imposes itself as transcendent..." (Bourdieu: 1997, p.130).

Transcendence that for Lévinas means: not the domination of the "other" but respect for the "Other" and, where the starting point for thinking is no longer being but the "other".

"... The family as an objective social category (structuring structure) is the foundation of the family as a subjective social category (structured structure), a mental category that is the beginning of thousands of representations and actions that contribute to reproducing the objective social category... (P. Bourdieu: 130).

The structure of the family is not only socio-cultural, but also anthropological, it is based on a structural requirement of the very being of man. Community of love and solidarity, a foundation that is found in the possibility of loving as a family and founding a community of life on this love. Antinomy that reveals internal structures analogous to those resulting from a phenomenological analysis of love when we mention the constitution of family relationships. The principle of parenthood introduces into the constitution of the "I" the awareness that intersubjective relations have their origin in a fundamental asymmetry. Pedagogical-existential meaning that forms the universal awareness of the fraternal relationship that unites us with another human being. Cultural epiphanies of familiarity cataloged from the ethnography of the family if that is the objective and task of the philosophy of the family to open the debate on the fact that the principle of the family is constitutively irreducible to any of its cultural epiphanies. Hence, consequently, it becomes a challenge for cultures to defend and promote renewed and continuous efforts to update history.

Faded family present, discomfort on the surface, where the meaning and function of the family is in debate. Three positions in Cullen's expression: build, deconstruct, be and be.

From these philosophical perspectives, the horizon of understanding allows us to see the problem of how the legitimate family is changing, conforming a number of ways of living that are called "family", not corresponding to the dominant family of other historical moment(s). /s. I am not expressing that they work inadequately, but that it becomes necessary to understand their meaning in moments of deep crisis of modernity and therefore of education.

I consider it relevant to incorporate the family into the position of deconstruction, since it would imply suspicion, together with the changes and crises in this present: reintegrating the questions, questioning oneself again, suspecting that there is no origin.

Putting under suspicion what refers to the reality that: "the same is not the same", opens up the difference and then it is Heidegger who says "being is given, but it is hidden, it is not pure presence".

"…Why the same? because ultimately it is the movement of life, it is the problems that persist. A philosophical problem is defined because in the answer that we are giving it, the problem persists and persists... and in fact science, ethics, politics persists and persists, as problems… we are giving answers and trying to say things, ways of raising, but the problem persists and persists" (Cullen: 2012).

In the words of Carlos A. Cullen: "in the same thing there is a border, something different from that itself; say what is not said in what is said; a thought from the edges, from the borders".

A concrete challenge that the family must assume responsibly, but it is not the same responsibility that was learned in another time. Taken to education, it is key because it is essential to know the students, to know about them, but none of this authorizes the reduction of the other to the image of the teacher.

Deep crisis of the family where it becomes relevant to incorporate the possibility of establishing in the human bond, great human issues:

"love", accepting the "vulnerability" that makes us responsible for the other as Other; "friendship" adding reasonable cooperation, "...relationship without dependency, without episode, and where nevertheless all the simplicity of life enters...(...)... friendship that relates to each other in difference and sometimes in the silence of the word…" (Blanchot, 1971: 328-329); and "justice", where caring for oneself leads to caring for the other and knowing that we are there caring, caring.

"…From the moment the other looks at me, I am responsible for him without even having to take responsibility in relation to him; your responsibility rests with me. It is a responsibility that goes beyond what I do…" (Levinas:1977;89)

What did Lévinas observe? ... that the basis of violence was interest, he warned that we should turn this interest into dis-interest, that is, having the obligation to put ourselves in the other's place without expecting anything in return. We had to emerge from the Cartesian ego and see beyond ourselves; accept that we are, as Aristotle pointed out in his Politics, civic animals; accept that by my side is the Other, thanks to which I am who I am.

In this way, he emphasized the idea of alterity, thus rejecting what was announced by ontology. This was characterized by reducing to the Same everything that was opposed to it as Other.

But who is the Other? "…The other is not Other with a relative otherness as, in a comparison, the species, even if they are last, mutually exclude each other, but they are located in the community of a genus, they exclude each other by their definition, they come close to each other by this exclusion through the community of its genre. The otherness of the Other does not depend on a quality that would distinguish it from the self, because a distinction of this nature It would imply precisely between us this community of gender that already annuls otherness…" (Levinas:1997;207). At this point I am going to transport the thinking of Rodolfo Kusch to deepen the analysis of the family today, expressing that it becomes relevant to understand the gesture and language of our people, but also the meaning that doing philosophy from there should have. A philosophy on the family would not be a culmination but a dynamic. It would be constant diving over the sense that surrounds it.

"Otherness as an experience of recognition has given way to difference as the core of the contemporary domain of tolerance and the passage to the homogenization of the other as absence of meaning" (Forster: 2009;103).

Family representations that, as an act of knowledge, allow us to draw an image, that is, a dynamic of human knowledge that reduces what is external to us to an internal representation. Relationship proper to knowledge that diminishes the exteriority to the sameness, to the subject who knows. However, there is an exteriority that is difficult to represent, a relationship of another type that is not one of knowledge, which according to Lévinas is: "the face of the other qua Other", which ethically questions. According to Lévinas, the starting point of philosophical thought should not be knowledge, but recognition, because through others I see myself. This will lead the author to replace the traditional categories with new ones such as the gaze or the face. Saying for Lévinas the face belongs to the scope of the

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expression, previous moment of the words, of the signs and of any other sign of the language; responds to the ethical moment; the face speaks, the manifestation of the face is already speech.

"… For Lévinas the notion of respect, before being a commandment, describes the situation of infinite distance we were talking about: respect is the look, the look from a distance. And, as you know, Lévinas redefines the person, the self and the other as faces. What he calls the face, both in the Jewish tradition and according to a new terminology, is entitled to respect. From the moment I am in relation to the other's face, when I speak to the other and when I listen to the other, the dimension of respect is open. Then, naturally, it is necessary to make ethics consonant with that situation and to resist all the violence that consists of repressing the face, ignoring the face or reducing respect..." (Derriga: 1997).

At the beginning of Totality and Infinity, at the point called "Desire for the invisible", Lévinas writes: "…True life is absent. But we are in the world. Metaphysics arises and is maintained in this excuse. It is directed towards the "other part, and the "other way" and the "other". In the most general form that it has taken in the history of thought, it appears, in effect, as a movement that starts from a world that is familiar to us - no matter what are the still unknown lands that border it or that hides it -, from a "in the self" that we inhabit, towards a foreign outside, towards a far away.

The terminus of this movement-the other part or the other-is called other in an eminent sense. No trip, no change of climate and environment could satisfy the desire that aspires towards him. The metaphysically desired other is not "other" like the bread I eat, or like the country I live in, like the landscape I contemplate, like sometimes, myself to myself, this "I", this "other". From these realities I can "nourish myself" and, to a great extent, satisfy myself, as if I were they would have simply been missing. For this very reason,

its otherness is reabsorbed in my identity as thinker or possessor. Metaphysical desire tends towards the totally other, towards the absolutely other…". (Lévinas, 2001: 57).

Lévinas opposes science and technology because they ask about the truth, they are ontological, his desire is to change this, considering that the truth causes oblivion by others. We have become so immersed in the complexity of the cogito that we have forgotten the simplicity of saying "thank you", "good afternoon", forgetting the imposed limits.

Lévinas also recognizes that not only are I and the Other, but that there is also a third party through which the laws are conditioned and justice is established.

"…To compare others, it is necessary for someone to judge, to judge an institution is necessary and, for there to be an institution, a State is required. The justice of the State is a diminishment of charity and not, as Hobbes believed, an attenuation of the fact that man is a wolf to man..." (Lévinas: 1990; 13)

I incorporate here the metaphor used by Parmenides, who was the first to explain this idea of a foundation. always equal to himself. Then he puts the metaphor of the sphere. This, in Euclidean geometry, is the perfect figure, all points are equidistant from the center, and throughout the history of metaphysics Hegel uses it again at the end, prior to Nietzsche, prior to Heidegger. Which leads me to express that the sphere seen from the traditional family model is blurred depending on the roles and their hierarchy, deinstitutionalizing the center.

However, we must avoid erasing what is human.

It is here, where I infer that what deconstruction does is break this using another metaphor, that of the Rhizome used by Deleuze. This situates the "between" as a determinant of the rhizome to become, the moment of passage from potency

to act. The "between" as a set of inseparable relationships from each other. All multiplicity grows through the middle, like a blade of grass or rhizome.

Positions that continue to open debates.

 "…It is the deep ambiguity that we maintain in front of our truth, that of not being deep down full. So, town, (and within it, I add: family) on the other hand, is an entity that informs us in the field, but, on the other hand, moves in we the ambiguous requirement of a truth that is difficult for us to assume…" (…). "...Popular thinking constantly plays between the mystical and the real..." (Kusch: 1978,106).

What is at stake is precisely the difference, because if I place the accent on the sameness of the family, I will be denying the difference. Difference is one thing where the referent is the same, and then I have an image or representation of the other that is different, but that is different because I relate it to that very thing, one thing is the "other of" and another thing is " the other qua Other".

What happens in the family encounter with the other as Other? The face of the other questions ethically. The face of the other expresses: "... do not violate me, do not reduce me to your sameness... (...) ... know me as a son/daughter; man, woman, brother/sister; help me to be-being so that I learn, but without reducing myself to being yourself…"

Violence in the deep sense of the ethical is precisely to reduce alterity to sameness. This gives rise not only to the overt explicit violence of destroying the Other, but all the subtle forms of violence of reducing my images or my representations. (Cullen: 2012).

The other qua Other, as an ethical relationship, is for Lévinas to speak of a foundation ρχή (Arjé). A v- ρχή, ναρχία - an-arjé -, from there comes the word anarchy which in Greek means without

Arjé, this is without origin in the sense that it is prior to all priority

In the sociological debate and in the work The Spirit of the Family (L'esprit de famille) P. Bourdieu expresses "…To understand the way in which the family goes from being a nominal fiction to becoming a real group, whose members are United by intense affective ties, it is necessary to consider all the symbolic and practical work tending to transform the obligation to love into a loving disposition and to endow each one of the family members with a "family spirit" generator of devotions, generosities, solidarity (There are also the countless continuous and ordinary exchanges of daily life, exchanges of gifts, services, help, visits, attention, kindness, etc.; as well as the extraordinary and solemn exchanges of family parties - frequently sanctioned and eternalized through photographs that consecrate the integration of the reunited family)..." (Bourdieu:131).

What has already been mentioned allows for the establishment of a body, the family fulfills a determining role in the maintenance and reproduction of the social order, thus constituting itself in a "well-founded social fiction" and guaranteed by the State.

 Levinasiana ethics is an ethics of justice. In other words, in order to live together, the presence of a State that guarantees us security is essential, even if this deprives us of part of our freedom. Lévinas will warn that the State must be democratic since, in a State faithful to justice, there is a constant concern to review the law (Levinas: 1990; 14). As the State and citizens have the same weight in a democracy, they could gradually change the laws and incorporate terms such as charity and solidarity in them, because what is required of justice is not to be supportive but just.

The author speaks (like Ricoeur in his work: Love and Justice) of a subordination of justice

and the State to the idea of charity, thus making citizens responsible for softening the harshness of the laws.

I recover again the meanings that Kusch gives to the word "being": essence, nature, value, price, esteem, existence, possession, domain; "being" as a category of substance, philosophically speaking. As for the word "to be": associated with the other categories (position, state, passion): to be in this or that place, this or that situation, condition, mode. It is inferred that the verb "to be" is used when dealing with circumstances and the verb "to be" is used to designate permanent states.

Hence, unraveling the meaning of "being" in the current family is talking about circumstances, it is not the same as saying "I am with my dad's family"; that "I am from the family of", the "I am" implies stability, the "I am" transience; instability of "being".

It is not very common to hear "being in life" but rather "being in it", precisely highlighting its brevity, its precariousness. "... Pretending to "be" without "being"...

And there "we are afraid of showing the truth" (Kusch: 26), because it implies abandoning the search for foundations and the whys of existence, allowing a conscience to emerge that tells us that we

are very little, and that our true condition is " be no more" conjugating ourselves in a world where the gods serve as encouragement in the face of that misery that constitutes us pure fear. And that "we know nothing about ourselves"

(Kush: 107)

"…Ways of being silent…splitting that denies and hides with a mask the truth of deep America… the truth within the family. Family that sometimes cannot understand the way of acting of that other as Other; It is not about mobilizing the mere

"being" reflected in the daily work of the family, to achieve comfort in the search for foundations for existence through "having", satisfying internal needs through objects.

The "to be" not only has a spatial link, but also has a temporary connotation in terms of duration, hence Kusch to refer to the "being of those who are", uses the "to be-being", implying that the action of being emerges from the background of being as the "pure being no more". In the Arraigo approach, being appears as the "from where" of the rooting (which gives roots to us and the symbolic), completed by its "where" and "the where" of the reception that implies being-rooted. "The where of welcome as another side of rooting is expressed in symbols such as that of mother earth or that of home. Sense of belonging to the land and confidence in Latin American life. Belonging and trust, as results of a field work where Kusch will try to show the "being" from the religious character that "being" itself has.

The "being" provides the being with the elements for its dynamics and the "being" for its part starts up as a sudden tension, generating the latter (tension) the awareness of "being".

"…The "being" is the small iceberg that floats in the sea of "being…" Another metaphor that Kusch uses to represent the dependent character of "being" with respect to "being".

"…Dramatic problem. To welcome the other in his language is to naturally take his language into account, not to ask him to renounce his language and all that it embodies, that is, norms, a culture (what is called a culture), customs, etc. The language is a body, it cannot be asked to renounce that... It is a question of a tradition, of a memory, of proper names. Of course, it is also difficult today to ask a nation-state to renounce to demand those who are welcomed to learn their language, their culture in a certain way…" (Derriga: 1997).

Synthesizing: "…Language as the presence of the face, invites us to complicity with the preferred being, to the sufficient "I-you" that forgets the universe: it refuses in its frankness the clandestinity of love in which it loses its frankness and its meaning becomes laughter or cooing. The third looks at me in the eyes of the other: language is justice…" (Lévinas: 2001; 226).

Today, to recognize that there are many families, many cultures is to accept the challenge of interacting in differences.

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